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Though Soviet centralised planning left the Caspian Sea littoral states 
of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turk-
menistan poorly developed and strug-
gling economically, their abundance of 
oil and gas resources brings hope for 
recovery. Turkmenistan is among the 
top 15 gas producers worldwide, while 
oil reserves in the Caspian Basin – com-
parable to those of the North Sea – have 
turned Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan into 
oil exporters.1 The question is whether 
they will be able to use their income 
from oil and gas exports to transform 
themselves into modern, diverse indus-
trial economies.2
Although it may seem that countries 
wealthy in natural resources should 
find it easy to develop economically, the 
experiences of some resource-based 
industrialising countries have proven 
otherwise, especially in the Middle East. 
The key to success appears to be eco-
nomic diversification, as demonstrated 
by the post-1960 industrialisation of oil 
exporters Iran and Malaysia and non-oil 
exporters Turkey and South Korea. The 
latter three countries invested revenue 
generated by agricultural or oil exports 
back into agriculture, manufactur-
ing, services and banking. Over time, 
restructuring sufficiently developed 
these sectors and allowed them to com-
pete globally, thus creating economies 
able to withstand sectoral shocks. By 
contrast, Iran did not create a globally 
competitive manufacturing or service 
sector; while collusion between the gov-
ernment and major oil and gas com-
panies, corruption and revenue mis-
management wasted income from oil 
and gas exports and made the economy 
dependent on them. This close relation-
ship between Iran’s oil revenues and 
its GDP seriously threatens economic 
growth by making it susceptible to 
‘Dutch Disease’: a drop in the global oil 
price directly stunts economic growth, 
whereas a rise blunts the competitive-
ness of other exporting sectors under 
inflationary pressure that hinders diver-
sification.
Politics as usual
An economy cannot truly diversify with-
out the twin buttresses of political and 
economic institutions. Since the 1980s, 
the intensified neo-liberal economic 
nature of globalisation, the collapse of 
communism and the subsequent wave 
of democratization created an interna-
tional political and economic setting 
that touted a market economy and 
democratic institutions as paramount to 
development. While a complete open-
ing up to the world economy is probably 
not a wise course of action, there is no 
doubt that change can only be sustained 
through complementary democratic 
and economic reforms. Political reform 
without economic reform fails to sus-
tain liberalisation; economic reform 
without political reform risks oligarchy. 
In the latter case, groups with no inter-
est in political liberalisation seize con-
trol of resources and turn the country 
into a rentier state: not dependent on 
taxing society for its income, the regime 
supports itself through, for example, oil 
and gas exports by state-owned com-
panies. Independent from society, the 
state becomes indifferent to the coun-
try’s development.
Unfortunately, the political reform 
attempts of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan 
and Turkmenistan have not bright-
ened the prospects for successful eco-
nomic restructuring. That President 
Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan, President 
Niyazov of Turkmenistan and former 
President Aliyev of Azerbaijan were sec-
retaries of their republics’ communist 
parties during the Soviet era demon-
strates what has happened in terms of 
post-independence political reform. In 
essence, the three countries exchanged 
communist rule for authoritarian rule. 
Although all three constitutions prom-
ise democratization, day to day politics 
show a different picture: opposition 
groups and parties are repressed, elec-
tions are manipulated, the independ-
ence of the judiciary is more than ques-
tionable and human rights are not a 
top priority. Kazakhstan might stand 
out for its open political debates and 
Azerbaijan for its press freedom, but all 
three regimes, instilled with old com-
munist attitudes, remain authoritarian, 
draining their political legitimacy by 
engendering cynicism and distrust of 
all political activity.
Economically, Kazakhstan’s reforms 
have led to a substantial shifting of 
assets to the private sector, an impres-
sively expanding banking sector, the 
privatisation of electricity and increased 
foreign investment. In Azerbaijan, reg-
ulatory reforms to liberalise trade policy 
and privatise agriculture and small and 
medium-sized businesses were hin-
dered by an inefficient public admin-
istration that entangled regulatory and 
commercial interests and bred corrup-
tion. Turkmenistan’s economic reform 
has taken a reluctant and slow-paced 
approach in which most reforms are 
either negligible or purely rhetorical. All 
three countries remain dependent on 
oil and gas exports: after an initial, post-
independence decline in GDP lasting 
until the mid-1990s, economic growth 
increased only because of oil and gas 
exports. Even though recent GDP has 
surpassed pre-independence levels, the 
World Bank estimates the percentage 
of the population living below the pov-
erty line in Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and 
Turkmenistan at 47, 20 and 50, respec-
tively. 
Resource curse
Against this backdrop, it is highly 
unlikely that diversification and indus-
trialisation will succeed, except perhaps 
in Kazakhstan. It seems that resource 
abundance can actually hinder devel-
opment and be more of a burden than 
a boon. The elitism and corrupt gov-
ernance born of authoritarian rule 
easily leads to nepotism within clan 
and family circles and the ‘resource 
curse’: the paradox that countries with 
an abundance of natural resources 
fail to develop economically because 
of governmental mismanagement 
of resource revenues. When wealth 
and power depend on one or a few 
resources, state elites often redirect 
state revenue to support these sectors 
in order to stay in power. In this sense 
resource revenues are not a solution to 
underdevelopment but integral to the 
maintenance of central governmental 
structures and self-enriching elites. 
The same elites often directly supervise 
– and effectively neuter – institutions 
ostensibly established to prevent such 
corruption, such as oil stabilization 
funds which ensure sufficient pub-
lic funds when oil prices are low, and 
which supervise their use to finance 
infrastructural projects and promote 
non-oil industry developments.  
For the curse to be lifted, centralisation 
must first be overcome. Centralisation 
around oil and gas export dependency 
increases the role of the state in the 
economy and job market and breeds 
inefficient production practices. Com-
bined with political centralisation, 
which in Central Asia is promoting 
authoritarianism and limiting taxa-
tion of the upper classes, state income 
remains dependent on oil and gas rev-
enues, which hinders the diversification 
of the economy.
Second, demand- and supply-induced 
scarcity must be addressed. Popula-
tion growth, rising per capita income, 
higher levels of consumption, and tech-
nological change can increase domes-
tic demand for fossil fuels to the point 
of scarcity. Supply-induced scarcity, 
meanwhile, refers to a decrease of the 
stock (or access to it) and inefficient 
use of supplies. Combined with the 
gradual depletion of resources, increas-
ing demand and decreasing supply will 
lead to less revenue from exports as 
more supplies will serve domestic use. 
If financing economic restructuring 
depends on export revenues, develop-
ment based on oil and gas income is 
uncertain.
Third, a deft sectoral investment strat-
egy is required. Given global competi-
tion, oil and gas income reallocation is 
not straightforward. For example, how 
will the Caspian Sea states compete 
with Chinese manufacturing? Global 
economic and political linkages can 
help. Especially if supported by market 
and democratic reforms, an attractive 
climate for transnational companies 
and foreign direct investment can create 
opportunities and markets that could 
lead to economic diversification.
Finally, violence poses a serious chal-
lenge to economic development. Dis-
putes over the control of oil and gas 
resources are all too familiar and often 
exacerbated by ethnic or religious hos-
tility, terrorism, poverty and politics. 
Finding lasting solutions is always a 
daunting task.. Education and the work 
of NGOs are necessary to create middle 
classes and minimise chances of radi-
calization.
A decentralisation model
A new path must be taken for Azerbai-
jan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan to 
avoid the resource curse and the fate of 
rentier statehood. An alternative policy 
model would involve the rearrange-
ment of political relations by decentral-
izing state structures in favour of more 
regional constellations. This would 
promote democratizing tendencies and 
limit central government control over 
energy income by giving regions say 
over how oil and gas income-funded 
investment is spent. More decentralised 
energy income redistribution would 
promote economic diversification, give 
the private sector breathing space, and 
spur civil society to grow and assert its 
influence. Crucial to this model is the 
balance between the government and 
local centres of power to keep each 
other in check. 
Although economic and especially polit-
ical decentralisation reforms will face 
elite opposition, the model suggests 
a practical alternative to dealing with 
centralisation and the resource curse. 
The removal of both paves the way for 
the diversification of economic sectors 
to address demand and supply-induced 
scarcity. This will not, however, solve all 
problems. High population growth, glo-
bal economic competition and terrorism 
are not directly targeted, and it remains 
to be seen to what extent these policy 
suggestions can be applied to Azerbai-
jan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. <
Notes
1.  Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan export 211,000 
and 997,000 barrels of oil per day, respec-
tively. Proven oil reserves in billions of 
barrels for Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and 
Turkmenistan are 7.0, 9.0 and 0.5, respec-
tively, and proven natural gas reserves are 
48.4, 67.1 and 102.4 trillion cubic feet. 
2.  Joachim Krause and Andrea Gawrich 
(Institute of Political Sciences, Christian-
Albrechts University) and Matthias Luecke 
and Natalia Trofimenko (Institute of World 
Economics, Kiel Germany) research the 
same topic within the Razkaz (Political 
and Economic Challenges of Resource-
Based Development in Azerbaijan and 
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